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ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding recent events that might be thought to create an
atmosphere especially hospitable for increases in federal
government secrecy, government initiatives favoring the
withholding of information have been accompanied by other
moves in the direction of greater openness. In his introduction to
a symposium on "Federal Secrecy After September 11 and the
Future of the Information Society," the author suggests that the
politics ofpost-September 11 information policy debates may be
complicated, in part, by social developments that are affecting the
non-instrumental cultural values Americans associate with access
to information. Specifically, information and communications
technologies are enabling and sustaining an unprecedented degree
of active participation for "ordinary" individuals in the creation of
culture and of social meaning, and thus fostering conditions
opposed to the assumptions about authority, categorical
coherence, and the susceptibility of information to isolation that
have historically made government secrecy seem both legitimate
and practicable. These developments do not mean that openness
will or should in principle prevail over secrecy in all debates
regarding public information policy. But they render the political
terrain for proponents of secrecy rougher to the extent that these
social changes make secrecy regimes seem more alien and
unnatural in the information society.
"Government openness" or "access to public information" is the
sort of public good that one would expect to be under-produced
because of well-known collective action problems in democratic
systems. Although access to government information yields predictable
benefits of many kinds, these benefits are likely to be relatively diffuse
among individual voters. Important institutions - most notably, the
press - may pursue openness policies out of some form of self-interest.
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But that does not mean voters will care enough about government
openness to cast ballots based on that issue. Where the disclosure of
information threatens some sort of focused harm or impediment to
political or economic interests who are attentive and well-organized,
one might expect, following rational choice theory, that the forces
opposed to openness would have a considerable advantage in battles
over government information policy, and elected policy makers will be
disproportionately responsive to their interests.
The retreat towards greater federal government secrecy that
America has endured for the last five years seems consistent with this
observation. And yet, it does not tell the full story. We are
simultaneously witnessing at least some critical moves towards
improved access, and prospects exist for a significant intensification of
popular interest in government openness. The opposing moves may
not be equivalent. There may not be, for every new restrictive
government practice, an equally powerful move in the opposite
direction. Yet the story is not monolithic, notwithstanding recent
events that might be thought to create an atmosphere especially
hospitable for increases in secrecy. The most notable of these were of
course the monstrous attacks of September 11, 2001.
There are many possible reasons why this political terrain is so
complex, many of which may be entirely contingent and ephemeral,
and many of which may be well explained in terms of the instrumental
self-interest of the relevant political actors. The post-September 11
information society, however, is also being shaped in part by a
different sort of phenomenon, namely, a change in the non-
instrumental cultural values associated with access to information. Put
simply, technological changes are fostering a cultural milieu in which
increasing numbers of Americans are more likely to regard access to
information as significantly constitutive of their identity as Americans,
wholly apart from the practical significance of such information. Such
cultural values would not themselves insure the ultimate triumph of
openness over secrecy in every information policy contest, and
perhaps they should not. But their vitality would suggest that the goal
of openness will remain more influential in the development of
information law and policy than rational choice theory would alone
suggest.
Interpreting information law and policy debates in light of identity
and cultural values draws insights from the seminal information age
social theory of Daniel Bell and Manuel Castells. 1 Their work
'See text at notes 37-51, infra. At the risk of stating the obvious, an essay this brief cannot do
justice to the nuances of Professor Bell's sociology or explore the relationships among
technology, information and identity with anything like the scope or depth of Professor
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provides an important lens through which to see contemporary
developments. Moreover, it provides a helpful context within which
to introduce this special issue of I/S on "Federal Secrecy After
September 11 and the Future of the Information Society." The articles
on this topic that follow this introductory essay were written in
response to a call for papers made possible with the support of The
Century Foundation, which received a grant from the John S. and
James L. Knight Foundation to promote scholarly inquiry into the
impacts of government secrecy. US is deeply grateful for this support.
Rather than provide a conventional precis of each article, however, I
will refer to each in passing while advancing the thesis of this essay.
I. MOVES TOWARD SECRECY AND OPENNESS
Evidence abounds of the increasing trend towards federal
government secrecy over the last five years. In the year following the
September 11 attacks, the government classified 11.3 million
documents, which jumped to 14.2 million the following year and 15.6
million the year thereafter. 2  The increase in pages classified was
accompanied by a substantial drop, since fiscal year 2001, in the
number of previously classified pages that the government
declassified.3 Agencies removed government documents from web
sites and publicly available databases, severely limiting the public's
ability to assess environmental and other risks. The government also
resorted increasingly to statutory exemptions to deny requests for
records sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).'
According to a study of 22 agencies by the Coalition of Journalists for
Open Government, the use of FOIA exemptions to deny requests
Castell's three volume study, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE
(2000). I have likewise made no effort in this essay to explore the differences in their social
models. Nonetheless, I think it important to note where I have borrowed their insights, which
substantially inspired the discussion that follows.
2 David Nather, Classified: A Rise in 'State Secrets', 63 CQ WEEKLY 1958, 1960 (2005).
3 Id. at 1965.
4 John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE: PRIVACY,
SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION AFrER SEPTEMBER 11, 11, 13-14 (Peter M. Shane, John
Podesta, and Richard C. Leone, eds., 2004); Laura Gordon-Mumane, Shhh!!: Keeping Current
on Government Secrecy, SEARCHER: THE MAGAZINE FOR DATABASE PROFESSIONALS, Jan.
2006, at 35, 36.
'28 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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jumped by 22 percent between the years 2000 and 2004, even though
the total number of FOIA requests to these agencies, the largest-
volume handlers of FOIA requests, dropped by 13 percent. Most
surprisingly, the increase had no apparent connection to national
security. Use of FOIA Exemption 1,7 which protects classified
information, actually dropped during this same period.
As has been widely observed, the Bush Administration's pursuit of
increased secrecy was very much in evidence prior to the September
11 attacks and is rooted in its expansive view of plenary executive
authority. 9 A dramatic indication of the Administration's stance was
its refusal to disclose, on grounds of executive privilege, the members
of Vice President Dick Cheney's Task Force on Energy Policy.' 0
President Bush also wasted little time in amending the executive order
concerning the release of records under the Presidential Records Act,
in order to slow the release of historical records from the Reagan
Administrations." His amendments provided, among other things,
that a former vice president - in this case, President Bush's father -
could claim executive privilege to prevent the disclosure qf vice
presidential records; in addition, executive privilege in general could
be invoked by the non-governmental designee of a former President,
such as Reagan, who had become incapacitated and unable to claim
executive privilege himself. 12 The Administration's expansive views
6 COALITION OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT (CJOG), WHEN EXEMPTIONS BECOME
THE RULE (undated document), at 2-3, available at http://www.cjog.net/documents/
ExemptionsStudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
7,,This section does not apply to matters that are-(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order..."
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
8 CJOG, supra note 6, at 3.
9 See generally U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMIrEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
MINORITY STAFF, SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMInISTRATION (Sept. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20050317180908-35215.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006).
10 Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Bruce P.
Montgomery, Congressional Oversight: Vice President Richard B. Cheney 's Executive
Branch Triumph, 120 POL. SCi. Q. 581 (Winter 2005-06).
I Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 5, 2001).
12 Id. at 56,028.
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of its constitutional right to secrecy were matched by its views on the
implementation of open government statutes. Attorney General
Ashcroft issued a memorandum on October 12, 2001 emphasizing the
willingness of the Bush Justice Department to defend any agency's
decision not to disclose information under FOIA, unless its invocation
of an exemption "lack[s] a sound legal basis."'13 The Ashcroft memo
replaced a 1993 Clinton Administration policy establishing a
presumption of disclosure under FOIA, and the willingness of the
Attorney General to defend nondisclosure decisions only when "the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an
interest protected by [the relevant FOIA] exemption.' 14 Although the
Ashcroft memo made no mention of national security, it was followed
in March, 2002, by a memorandum to heads of executive departments
and agencies from the President's Chief of Staff encouraging them to
protect from release any information that they deemed to be "sensitive
but unclassified."'
15
In the wake of September 11, Congress lent its support in critical
ways to the trend towards secrecy. The USA PATRIOT Act16
significantly expanded the authority of the executive branch to engage
in covert law enforcement and intelligence operations. It broadened
the scope of private records that may be obtained without notice
through third parties who themselves are forbidden to disclose the fact
of any such search.' It increased the availability of so-called "sneak
and peak" warrants for searches that do not entail the seizure of
property.18 It lowered the bar for obtaining secret warrants for foreign
13 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, for Heads of all Federal Departments
and Agencies: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001 foiapostl9.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006),
14 Memorandum of Attorney General Janet Reno for Heads of Departments and Agencies Re:
the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/clintonlreno.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
IS Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Action to Safeguard Information
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Documents Related to
Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002), available at
http://cio.doe.gov/Documents/wh031902.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
16 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
17 1d. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287-88 (2001).
'" Id. § 213, 115 Stat. at 286 (2001).
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intelligence searches from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. 
9
More directly relevant in terms of general public access to
information, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act to
mandate the nondisclosure of so-called critical infrastructure
information voluntarily submitted to federal agencies.20 The mandate
covers information "not customarily in the public domain and related
to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems," 2' and
can be used to hide from public view environmental or safety risks, the
disclosure of which would prove embarrassing to private firms. In one
truly odd case involving the apparent misuse of this authority, the
Brick Township Municipal Utilities Authority in New Jersey denied a
resident's request for access to an electronic map of the town's land
parcels on the ground that the map had successfully been submitted to
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as critical infrastructure
information. The Authority was willing, however, to sell the resident
a paper copy of the same map.
22
Yet more extreme secrecy proposals exist. For example, under a
proposed Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development
Act of 2005, now pending in the Senate, Congress would create in the
Department of Health and Human Services a new agency - the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency - to
coordinate and accelerate advanced research into potential
countermeasures against biomedical threat.23 Under the proposed Act:
"Information that relates to the activities, working groups, and
advisory boards of the BARDA shall not be subject to disclosure
under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, unless the Secretary
or Director determines that such disclosure would pose no threat to
national security. 24  This change would effectively reverse the
ordinary FOIA presumption in favor of disclosure25 and allow the
'
9 1d. § 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (2001).
20 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2152 (2002)
(to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133).
2 1 Id. § 212(3), 116 Stat. 2151 (2002).
22 OMB Watch, First Public Case of Critical Infrastructure Information (Aug. 8, 2005),
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2977 (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
23 S. 1873, 109' Cong. (2005).
24 Id. § 3 (proposing to add 42 U.S.C. § 319L(0(2)).
25 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2002).
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agency to bypass classification as the appropriate process for
protecting national security-related information from inappropriate
disclosure.
Still, this is not the whole story. In organizing White House
oversight of the executive branch regulatory process, President Bush
left in place an executive order promulgated by President Clinton that
significantly increased the transparency of that process.26 The Clinton
Order required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
maintain a publicly available log containing the status of all pending
regulatory actions under White House review, notations of
communications from OMB to the agency, and the "names of
individuals involved in all substantive oral communications" between
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and "any person not
employed by the executive branch., 27 Although this provision does
not close all avenues to possible off-the-record conversation between
the White House and special interests on regulatory matters, OMB
now makes this information available, via its web site, despite the
Reagan Administration's successful legal claim nearly 20 years ago
that none of this material is subject to mandatory disclosure under
FOIA.28 This is clearly a positive development.
In a similar vein, the Administration has organized what is called
the "eRulemaking Initiative.,,29  Among its goals has been the
development of a centralized government-wide docket management
system for government rulemaking that allows members of the public
"to access and search all publicly available regulatory material, such as
Federal Register notices and rules, supporting analyses, and comments
submitted by the public. 30  Although, strictly speaking, this initiative
26 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67
Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26,2002).
27 Id. § 6(b)(4)(C).
28 Wolfe v. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(information concerning status of FDA regulations in OMB review process exempt from
mandatory FOIA disclosure because it is protected by deliberative privilege).
29 Beth Simone Noveck, The Future of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State, 1 ISJLP 1,
2-8 (2005).
30 Regulations.gov, Welcome to the eRulemaking Initiative,
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic-rel I 1/custom/jsp/navigation/about.jsp (last visited
Feb. 8, 2006).
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does not increase the number of documents potentially available to the
public, it so enhances the practicability of obtaining those documents as
to count as a significant step forward in government openness.
There has also been bipartisan movement in Congress towards the
goal of government openness. Republican Senator Jon Conryn and
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy are co-sponsoring the "Openness
Promotes Effectiveness in Our National [OPEN] Government Act of
2005," which would impose a variety of management reforms to
improve agency responsiveness to FOIA requests. 31  The bill also
proposes to amend FOIA32 so that no statute enacted subsequently
could be deemed to imply legal authority to withhold records under
FOIA Exemption 3 unless the statute provided such authority in
explicit terms.3 3  This would make it more difficult for agencies to
claim legal authority to withhold records and would require Congress
to decide more conspicuously whether categories of records would or
would not be disclosable under FOIA.
It seems apparent from these latter developments that the emerging
pattern of government information policy cannot be regarded in an
undifferentiated way as for or against openness. While the record of
the Bush Administration may tilt decisively towards secrecy, it has
taken at least some steps towards oRenness, and has even retreated on
at least one pro-secrecy initiative. Likewise, despite the seeming
ease with which Congress went along after September 11 with
Administration recommendations for less disclosure, congressional
sentiment among Republicans, as well as Democrats, is diverse on
issues concerning freedom of information. This has been especially
evident in congressional resistance to permanent reauthorization of all
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
31 S. 394, 109th Cong. (2005).
32 Id. § 8 (proposing to amend 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000)).
33 "(b) This section does not apply to matters that are--(3) specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld." Id.
34 "Last year, the Department of Homeland Security tried to require employees to sign non-
disclosure agreements that would have barred them from sharing even unclassified
information with the public. The department threatened to search offices to make sure no one
broke the rules. It backed down in January under pressure from the two major unions that
represent employees of the department." Nather, supra note 2, at 1961-1962.
35 In December 2005, a Senate vote on the permanent reauthorization of all provisions of the
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Many reasons for the vigor of pro-openness values in debates over
federal policy are undoubtedly rooted in the self-interest of politically
salient actors. Access to information may enhance the political
position of members of Congress, just as it may serve the instrumental
interests of outside constituencies. One can expect the institutional
press and university researchers to campaign vigorously for access to
government records as a means of facilitating their work. Public
interest groups organized around specific substantive concerns, such
as environmental protection or public health issues, may be expected
to push for government openness as instrumental in monitoring the
agencies that they seek to influence most directly.
A critically important set of constituents in this respect may be
state and local governments. As Ryan Lozar argues in his
commentary, "Federal Secrecy and the States: The Impact of
Information Closures on Local Government Operations," federal
secrecy policy may impair the capacity of government officials at
other levels to address public needs most effectively, thus weakening
their own political position.36 Given the close relationships state and
local officials routinely enjoy with members of Congress, one would
expect them to provide a frequently effective voice on the side of
sharing government information.
Yet, the press and the nonprofit community are apparently of the
view that the attractiveness of "openness values" reaches more broadly
than individual self-interest alone would suggest. In March, 2005, the
American Association of Newspaper Editors (AANE), backed by a
grant from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation (which is also
backing this symposium), launched its first national "Sunshine Week"
campaign to raise public awareness of access to government issues.
Over 750 participants, including journalism groups, media companies,
state press associations, open-government and First Amendment
advocates, librarians, civic groups, educators and student journalists
participated through their writings or involvement in local events.
37
USA PATRIOT Act was forestalled by a successful filibuster staged by 41 Democrats, 1
Independent, and 5 Republicans. Michael Sandier, Only Brief Extension ofAnti-Terrorism
Law, 63 CQ WEEKLY 3394, 3394 (2005).
36 Ryan Lozar, Federal Secrecy and the States: The Impact of Information Closures on Local
Government Operations, 2 ISJLP 103 (2006).
37 Information about Sunshine Week events appears at a web site created by the AANE for
this purpose. See Sunshineweek.org, http://www.sunshineweek.org (last visited Feb. 16,
2006) (the list of 2005 participants is available at Sunshineweek.org, Sunshine Week 2006
Expands Push For Open Government, http://www.sunshineweek.org/sunshineweek/y2funding
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006)).
20061 SHANE
x I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:1
Although it is clear why many of these actors would have the incentive
to direct energy towards influencing government officials, the scope of
these events strongly suggests a serious expectation that the themes
articulated and values expressed would resonate widely with the
general public, even at a time of profound public concern about
national security. The AANE was sufficiently encouraged by its
success to plan another national Sunshine Week for March, 2006.
This background does not suggest any algorithm, of course, by
which to predict how specific future information policy contests will
work out. Every battle over access to records at any level of
government occurs in its own political context and affects its own
discrete set of organized interests. Yet, if we look at how our culture
is evolving, and especially at how information technology is pushing
that culture, then these disputes may turn out to implicate more than
the array of those forces for or against increased openness who have
concrete interests at stake and whose incentives are shaped in a
measured way by those incentives. Arguments for secrecy may face
an increasingly uphill battle because Americans perceive their
entitlement to information as entailed in their very identity as
American citizens living in the information age. That identity is
shaped, I believe, by forces that go beyond either self-interest,
narrowly defined, or even by popular allegiance to conventional
democratic values.
II. INFORMATION AGE SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
CITIZEN ENTITLEMENT TO INFORMATION
In his magisterial interpretation of society in the information age,
Manuel Castells defines "identity" as "the process by which a social
actor recognizes itself and constructs meaning primarily on the basis
of a given cultural attribute or set of attributes to the exclusion of a
broader reference to other social structures. Castells cites Craig
Calhoun for the proposition that identity plays a "decisive role.., in
defining politics in contemporary American society,, 39 and Alain
Touraine for the yet more ambitious assertion that:
[I]n a post-industrial society, in which cultural services have
replaced material goods at the core of production, it is the
38 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOcIETY 22 (2d ed. 2000).
39 Id. (quoting CRAIG CALHOUN, SOCIAL THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 4 (1994)).
SHANE
defense of the subject, in its personality and in its culture,
against the logic of apparatuses and markets, that replaces
the idea of class struggle.40
Taking these propositions as starting points, I want to argue for the
possibility that political disputes over access to government
information may prove to be important terrain for witnessing how
individuals engage in Touraine's "defense of the subject." That is, we
may be entering a period in which individual citizens cast ballots and
organize politically around the issue of government openness not
because of self-interest, narrowly defined, but in order to assert a
certain way of understanding themselves. The association individuals
make between their personal identity and an individual entitlement to
public information may be rooted increasingly not only in
considerations of instrumental utility, but also in the cultural meaning
that access to information acquires.
In sketching this hypothesis, I find it helpful to start with a
conception of social structure articulated by Daniel Bell, our seminal
theorist on the nature of post-industrialism. In The Cultural
Contradictions of Capitalisma and a recent edition of his classic The
Coming of Post-Industrial Society,42 he sets forth a conception of
society that suggests how struggles over the values at play in contests
over government information policy may be structured.
Bell's theory rejects the position that society is best understood as
an integrated, holistic system or web of systems.43 Instead, he
describes society in terms of three disjunctive realms, which he calls
the techno-economic structure, the polity, and the culture. As
explained by Bell:
40 Id. (quoting ALAIN TOURAINE, QU'EST-CE-QUE C'EST LA DtMocRATIE? 168 (1994)
(translated by Castells).
41 DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976) [hereinafter
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS].
42 Daniel Bell, The Axial Age of Technology - Foreword: 1999, THE COMING OF POST-
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY ix (Special Anniversary ed. 1999) [hereinafter POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY].
43 Id. at xviii-xix; CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 41, at 10.
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The techno-economic order is concerned with the
organization of production and the allocation of goods and
services. It frames the occupation and stratification system
of the society and involves the use of technology for
instrumental ends .....
The polity is the arena of social justice and power: the
control of the legitimate use of force and the regulation of
conflict.., in order to achieve the particular conceptions of
justice embodied in a society's traditions or in its
constitution, written or unwritten....
I mean by culture... the realm of symbolic forms and...
more narrowly the arena of expressive symbolism: those
efforts, in painting, poetry, and fiction, or within the
religious forms of litany, liturgy, and ritual, which seek to
explore and express the meanings of human existence in
some imaginative form."
Although none of these realms dictates the others, that is, "there
are no simple, determinate relations among the three realms, ' 5 they
experience interrelated development. Thus, for the past 500 years, the
trajectory of Western civilization, in Bell's view, has been
increasingly to situate the individual person as the critical social unit
in each of these realms.46 This evolution has been accompanied by a
preoccupation in every realm with "the new," and with the capacity of
individuals to master the world and remake themselves.47
The overlap does not mean that the more specific values projected
in each realm of society are consistent. Individualism in the techno-
economic order realized itself in the form of the "bourgeois
entrepreneur." 48 In culture, society has seen the rise of the "independent
artist," and "in its extreme form.. .the idea of the untrammeled self."49
" CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 41, at 11-12.
4 1Id. at 12.
"Id. at 16.
47 id.
48id.
49 id.
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Although these figures and impulses arose simultaneously, they are
antagonistic:
[T]he extraordinary paradox is that each impulse.., became
highly conscious of the other, feared the other, and sought to
destroy it. Radical in economics, the bourgeoisie became
conservative in morals and cultural taste. The bourgeois
economic impulse was organized into a highly restrictive
character structure whose energies were channeled into the
production of goods and into a set of attitudes toward work
that feared instinct, spontaneity, and vagrant impulse.. .The
cultural impulse.. .turned into rage against bourgeois
values.50
As Bell sees it, by the 1970s, the values of culture had become
supreme.5' There is not space here to attend to all the nuances of his
argument, but, in at least one sense, I would want to insist (and Bell
does not contradict this) that there is still a clear disjunction. That is,
the techno-economic order is still primarily instrumental; it still
deploys technology for instrumental ends, and is characterized in
general by hierarchical structures in which higher levels are held
legitimately to exercise control over lower levels. The realm of
culture, by contrast, is still - as Bell says - "a continual process of
sustaining an identity through the coherence gained by a consistent
aesthetic point of view, a moral conception of self, and a style of life
which exhibits those conceptions... "5 The economy, in other words,
aims at production. Culture aims at meaning.
If we conceptualize society this way, then it seems fairly
straightforward that the values most supportive of government
arguments for control of information are values that resonate chiefly in
the techno-economic order. The case on behalf of secrecy is that
society wants the production of a good - call it "national security" -
for which the President and his bureaucracy have been made the
production managers. The information they possess that is relevant to
this good is something akin to government property, and they are best
situated to deploy that information for the effective production of the
good that society wants. It hardly seems a coincidence that President
50 Id. at 17.
" Id. at 33.
52 Id. at 36.
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George W. Bush, as ardent a champion of secrecy as ever inhabited
the White House, has been so often described as a "CEO President."
By contrast, at least at the present moment, the value of openness
originates most powerfully within the impulses of American culture.
It is the realm of culture in which everyone is now seen - even if
somewhat implausibly - to be equally the author of their own lives, in
which boundaries between the realms of public and private are
dissolving, and in which anything and everything is up for searching,
digesting, and reprocessing.
When applied to government information, this idea may at first
seem counterintuitive. It may seem more likely that values of
openness in government develop most directly in the realm of the
polity itself, rather than in culture. After all, American ideas of
legitimacy turn pivotally on ideas of accountability, and accountability
is typically associated in modem democratic theory with government
transparency. One might expect, therefore, that democratic practice
itself would provide the soil in which values of openness would take
root most tenaciously.
The phenomenon I am discussing, however, is not an "either/or"
proposition. Values of openness do appear conspicuously in our
political realm, which emphasizes the importance of each citizen
having his or her equal voice, rights to participation and a claim to the
attentive responsiveness of elected representatives. 5n Ideas supportive
of openness - that each citizen is entitled to assess government
performance for him- or herself, that information in government hands
is public property, that secrecy is a threat to the rule of law and
political accountability - all loom large in our political discussions.
As a source of values in contemporary America, however, the
political order may readily be perceived as secondary to both the
techno-economic and cultural realms. This is because the ways in
which each realm of society contributes to individual identity depends
substantially on actual experience in that realm. Each member of
society is inevitably a participant in the rituals of culture on a daily, if
not hourly basis; we are experiencing, on a near-continuous basis,
cultural symbols, products, and messages with which we necessarily
grapple to give our lives meaning and coherence. Moreover, the vast
majority of adult citizens in society occupy themselves on a near-daily
basis with activities directly linked to the techno-economic realm.
53 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 35-61 (1998); Peter M. Shane, The
Electronic Federalist: The Internet and the Eclectic Institutionalization of Democratic
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLMCAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE
INTERNET 65 (Peter M. Shane, ed., 2004).
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Compared to these activities, individual experience of citizenship is
thin. As observed by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin:
The rituals of citizenship have been stripped down to a
precious few . .. [I]t is quite possible to live in America
today without regularly dealing with others as fellow
citizens - fellow workers or professionals, yes; fellow
religionists or union members, yes; but fellow citizens,
focusing on our common predicament as Americans? We
may wave the flag, but we begin quickly to run out of
citizenship activities.54
Except for a minority who do participate regularly in the affairs of
government or party politics, most Americans probably do not
experience the political realm with sufficient intensity to shape their
world view with the same vigor as the economy and culture. It is even
true that Americans are more likely these days to understand the
workings of the polity chiefly through cultural products. As I write
this, there are three fictional American Presidents regularly appearing
on network television dramas,55 and increasing numbers of Americans
learn about political issues through the monologues and commentaries
of late-night television comedians.56
But there is an additional reason why culture is now such a
powerful social realm for the construction of identity. That is, we
finally have information and communications technology that is
congruent with culture's ambitions for the untrammeled self.
Technology is thus key to our emerging reality and to my argument that
the cultural realm is increasingly one in which "access to information"
is understood and internalized as a natural condition of life.
Daniel Bell's characterization of contemporary culture is as
resonant now as when written 30 years ago:
5 BRUCE AcKERMAN & JAMEs S. FIsHXIN, DELIBERATION DAY 178-79 (2004).
55 They are: Democratic President Jed Bartlett on NBC's The West Wing, political
independent (elected vice-president, however, on a Republican ticket) Mackenzie Allen on
ABC's Commander-in-Chief, and President Charles Logan, apparently a Democrat - he shares
a top advisor with a Democratic predecessor - but with an uncanny physical resemblance to
Richard Nixon, on Fox's 24.
56 PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, PERCEPTIONS OF PARTISAN BIAS SEEN
AS GROWING - ESPECIALLY BY DEMOCRATS: CABLE AND INTERNET LOOM LARGE IN
FRAGMENTED POLITICAL NEWS UNIVERSE 2 (2004), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/200.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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Modem culture is defined by [the] extraordinary freedom to
ransack the world storehouse and to engorge any and every
style it comes upon. Such freedom comes from the fact that
the axial principle of modem culture is the expression and
remaking of the "self' in order to achieve self-realization
and self-fulfillment. And in its search, there is a denial of
any limits or boundaries to experience. It is a reaching out
for all experience; nothing is forbidden, all is to be
explored. 7
In 1976, when Bell wrote these words, the notion of the self
defying all limits or boundaries - especially for the "ordinary" person
who had not self-consciously dedicated his or her life to artistic
expression - might have seemed plausible primarily at a metaphorical
level. Sitting in my room, I might have wished to put a classical sound
track to a film of Korean folk dance, to superimpose the faces of
contemporary politicians on Da Vinci's picture of The Last Supper, or
to create absurdist drama by extracting words from the Bible with a
random number generator. These things, however, would have been
difficult, if not impossible with the tools conveniently available.
Today, they are literally child's play. If my computer is on, I can
download "The Folktales of Meandash: The Mythic Sami Reindeer,"
58
faster than I can look up "Lapland" in my dictionary. I can instantly
acquire digital images of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and the
actors in Brokeback Mountain, and combine them in satirical ways. I
can acquire, manipulate, and republish at virtually no marginal cost a
practically infinite array of texts, images, and sounds. It is no
exaggeration that, with a good broadband connection, there is
currently available to me within seconds more "information" than,
prior to 1980, would probably have been found within the national
libraries of most nations on earth. And, echoing Bell, "nothing is
forbidden, all is to be explored."
What is transformative about the technology, however, is not just
what it permits us to acquire. Its revolutionary impact lies in its ability
to change us into active creators of meaning. Perhaps the most widely
discussed such phenomenon is "blogging," the creation of individual
"weblogs" or "blogs," for short, that are a kind of individually
57 CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 41, at 13-14.
58 A January 23, 2006 Google search for the phrase "Folktales of Meandash: The Mythic
Sami Reindeer" actually yielded 67 links. A representative site is
http://haldjas.folklore.eelfollorelvol 1 I/pdf/meandash.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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produced online magazine or journal. One online search enine,
technorati.com, claims to cover 27 million of these productions, 5 and
there is no reason to expect growth to slow.
°
Moreover, the phenomenon of "meaning creation" is not limited to
what even its practitioners would presumably recognize as self-
conscious authorship. To take what might seem to be a more mundane
example - except that it is revolutionizing the music industry - the
process of "downloading" music is steadily eroding the market for
compilations of music in the forms of compact discs that are pre-
arranged by professional producers. The capacity to organize one's
own music has not only made Apple's iPod an industry-leading
technology, but Apple invites subscribers to its "iTunes" downloading
service to share the playlists of downloaded music they create. On the
date of this writing, the iTunes web site made available 332,560 of
these individually created playlists turning hundreds of thousands of
individual listeners into the equivalent of radio program directors. No
brief sampling can do full justice to the interpretive range of these
creations, but the fact that one is called, "America Right or Wrong,"
and another, "A Bitter Democrat's Playlist" should give us some idea
of the degree to which iMixers regard their enterprise as expressive of
larger meanings.
Of course, not every blogger, iMixer, digital video artist, or
webmaster will become a newly committed activist to the cause of
government transparency, but my argument is a different one. It is
that the increasingly widespread experience of cultural participation
now enabled by digital technologies will all but inevitably erode the
key conditions that make government secrecy seem natural and
presumptively legitimate. I take these preconditions to be isolation,
categorization, and authority.
First, the phenomenon of government secrecy depends on the
capacity of those in authority to isolate sensitive information from the
public domain. Such information must be maintained under secure
circumstances. The sharing of such information must be subject to
official permission and tight control. As more and more information is
digitized, however, its security becomes increasingly problematic.
59 Technorati.com, http://www.technorati.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
60 David Siftly, State of The Blogosphere, March 2005, Part 1: Growth of Blogs (March 14,
2005), http://www.sifry.com/alerts/archives/000298.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
61 Urbannetwork.com, Record Sales Suffer Steep Decline (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.urbannetwork.com/cms/index.php?news=434 (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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And - and this is the point where culture comes into play - the non-
sharing of information seems increasingly alien to Americans. The
proliferation of computers, cell phones, PDAs, and other devices has
made the sharing of information, however private and idiosyncratic,
seem the very point of having information in the first place. In this
respect, the techno-economic sphere significantly reinforces the
cultural impulse towards sharing. Online collaborative work is
increasingly the norm. In both their private and public lives, people
are increasingly alert to the additional value to be realized by
collective information processing. Not only is it becoming
increasingly difficult to quarantine information, but the activity of
isolating information is itself increasingly suspect.
Second, government secrecy depends substantially on
categorization. The very process of identifying and labeling
information in a manner consistent with the level of its national
security sensitivity is called "classification., 62  Such information is
handled, in turn, by persons who are identified as having role-
appropriate access by virtue of a precisely labeled security clearance.
The more porous the boundaries between secret and non-secret, or
between sensitive and routine, the more incoherent the secret-keeping
enterprise threatens to become.
Digital culture, by contrast, is deeply hostile to informational
boundaries. As but one of a great many possible examples, consider
Carnegie Mellon University's Studio for Creative Inquiry (SCI) in its
College of Fine Arts. SCI's website describes it as:
a center for experimental and interdisciplinary arts ...
Founded in 1989, the Studio connects artistic enterprises to
academic disciplines across the Carnegie Mellon campus, to
the community of Pittsburgh and beyond. The Studio's
mission is to support creation and exploration in the arts,
especially interdisciplinary projects that bring together the
arts, sciences, technology, and the humanities, and impact
63local and global communities.
62 Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Materials 711-
714 (2d ed. 2005).
63 Overview of Carnegie Mellon College of Fine Arts: Studio for Creative Inquiry,
http://www.cmu.edu/studio/overview/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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Among its art projects - and this project is not unusual for SCI - is
an initiative called "3 Rivers, 2 rd Nature." The web site describes the
project as follows:
This project addresses the meaning, form and function of the
three river systems and 53 streams of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania in partnership with the 3 Rivers Wet Weather
Demonstration Project. A team of artists, historians,
botanists, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) specialists,
landscape architects, scientists, engineers and water policy
experts is developing an historic database, and a
contemporary baseline of water quality, river edge plant life,
bank conditions and the history of public access and private
use. The team will also conduct a policy and value analysis
of stormwater alternatives, stream restoration and stream
daylighting.
It is impossible to perceive any difference between the kinds of
information this art studio considers relevant to self-expression and the
kinds of information environmental scientists seeking National
Science Foundation funding would likely hope to amass. It is likely
that Carnegie Mellon artists would be interested in obtaining the very
kinds of information that the Environmental Protection Agency
removed from its web site after September 11.65
Perhaps, most basically, a secrecy system depends on the
legitimacy of authority. It makes no sense for government to keep
secrets unless the polity believes that certain individuals, by virtue of
their position, have legitimate entitlements to information access that
other citizens do not. The sources of such authority may be elected or
appointed position, expertise, or some combination. Our cultural
trajectory, however, threatens to erode such notions of authority
simply by transforming us from passive recipients of messages into
active, self-aware creators of meaning. If, as a web-surfer, I have
sufficient authority over millions of cultural artifacts to be able to
subject them to my manipulation, commentary, republication, and so
on, the idea that there is information over which I am not entitled to
exercise some share of dominion is going to come with greater difficulty.
64 Current Projects of Carnegie Mellon College of Fine Art: Studio for Creative Inquiry,
http://www.cmu.edu/studio/projects/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
65 Podesta, supra note 4, at 13.
2006] SHANE
xx I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:1
Pressed too far, these connections may seem like a stretch. But I
am not trying to make a reductionist argument that people who think
they are entitled to shuffle their iPod or create art out of chemical risk
maps will reject out-of-hand the idea that their government can keep
nuclear secrets or conduct clandestine national security investigations.
I am urging something subtler, namely, that the ever-more routine
cultural activities of meaning creation, enabled and sustained by our
infinitely networked technology, will make increasingly unnatural the
idea that only a few people are entitled to know things about the state
of the world that are massively important to our health, security, and
well-being, and about which we must remain ignorant. One would
expect that defenders of secrecy would have, culturally speaking, a
harder time of it in the long-run, and that the strong strain in popular
culture that favors category blasting, information sharing, and self-
authoring will strengthen allegiance to values of access to information
and government transparency in the political sphere.
66
III. INTRODUCING THE SYMPOSIUM
One can see the conflicting impulses at work in this policy domain
within this special issue of I/S, including the commentary by Ryan
Lozar (noted above) on the impact of federal secrecy on state and local
government. In "Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and
Ethics in the Security State, '67 attorney and writer Paul Gowder argues
for a normative view of public information policy that would regard
secrecy as an assault on our existential freedom. Precisely because
information barriers limit our capacity to create meaning, Gowder says
we should be wary of philosophical defenses of secrecy that are based
on utility. "[S]ecrecy," he writes, "cloaks the effects of secrecy," 68
66 Professor Edward Lee has argued that there are strong conceptual and doctrinal connections
between the idea of the "public domain" as it arises in public information law and the idea of
the "public domain," as elaborated in intellectual property law. He worries that government
measures limiting the public domain in the area of government secrecy may coincide with
assertions of copyright law to remove cultural works from the public domain, with
catastrophic, "democracy-disabling" results. Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The
Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through
Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 91, 209 (2003). Lee's analysis reinforces
my argument that the realms of culture and polity are linked, and that values rooted in the
former domain may legitimate or subvert policy arguments urged in the latter.
67 Paul Gowder, Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the Security State,
2 ISJLP 1 (2006).
" Id. at 24.
thus defeating the only condition under which a genuinely democratic
polity could rationally deliberate whether secrecy is legitimate and
thus create legitimate conditions for its pursuit.
By way of contrast, in "Normative Dimensions of Paternalism and
Security," 69 lawyer and political scientist Lisa Nelson argues that
paternalistic government policies may be justified if necessary to
preserve liberty in the face of potential harm. She reports on a pilot
survey seeking to understand the conditions under which citizens
might approve paternalistic policies. Her findings suggest that the
respondents did not judge the acceptability of paternalism entirely by
the magnitude of harm sought to be avoided. Rather, they also
considered the degree to which they would experience the
government's paternalistic action as a constraint on their liberty,
whether the interference with their liberty could be persuasively linked
with the potential of forestalling harm, and whether conditions
generally warranted trust and confidence in government.70 This
framework suggests a public information ethic more instrumental in
nature than Paul Gowder would prefer, but still significantly attuned to
the relationship of information to individual liberty. It is also
intriguing to note that the paternalism at issue in Professor Nelson's
survey involved government acquisition of personal data about
citizens, not secret-keeping per se. It is not clear that her tentative
findings are generalizable across this entire domain. To the extent
secrecy diminishes trust and confidence in government, the public is
less likely, even under Nelson's rubric, to acquiesce in the legitimacy
of paternalistic action.
In "Terrorism in the Information Society: Implications for
Biosecurity and Federal Secrecy Policy,"' 1 Brian J. Gorman assesses
the complex forces militating for and against openness in the context
of biosecurity policy. While he states the importance of not arming
would-be bioterrorists with science helpful to their goals, 72 Professor
Gorman likewise notes the dilemma that all science, presumably
including science in pursuit of biosecurity, "advances at its greatest
pace in an open environment where findings are accessible,
69 Lisa J. Nelson, Normative Dimensions of Paternalism and Security, 2 ISJLP 27 (2006).
'
0Id. at35.
71 Brian J. Gorman, Terrorism in the Information Society: Implications for Biosecurity and
Federal Secrecy Policy, 2 ISJLP 53 (2006).
721d. at 78.
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transparent and replicable by any interested party."73  Noting the
increasing difficulty of maintaining secrecy in a world in which
personal biolabs may be as easy to obtain as personal computers,
Professor Gorman calls for a new paradigm of information sharing in
the realm of science so that undue secrecy does not inhibit security
advances.74 His analysis strongly implies that the conceptualization of
information policy in dichotomous terms - public versus private,
secret versus open - may not be sufficiently fluid to capture the social
processes under which information is optimally managed to protect us
from harm.
The final commentary in the symposium, "Using Open Internet
Standards to Provide Greater Access in a Post-9/11 World,, 75 argues
directly that government should take advantage of new technologies to
enhance, rather than restrict public access to information. Attorney
Ari Schwartz implicitly urges advocates of openness to go beyond
campaigns for the absence of legal restriction on information
acquisition. Instead, government should recognize and implement the
capacity of technology to make information more reliable and more
easily retrievable across traditional agency boundaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the horrors of September I 1 and the President's pre-existing
penchant for enhancing executive authority, the Bush Administration's
accelerated push for secrecy hardly seems surprising. What seems
more remarkable are the limited political traction of arguments on
behalf of government secrecy and the continued push for new
initiatives that would make public information yet more readily
available. Because some kinds of secrecy inevitably make life easier
for people and institutions in power, advocates of openness need
always be vigilant. But the direction of the realm of culture in post-
industrial society may help in their cause. This is not to say that
campaigns on behalf of secrecy are doomed to fail, that every claim
for secrecy lacks adequate justification, or that the individualist strain
in our culture, imported wholesale into our political life, is always an
71 Id. at 58.
74 Id. at 82.
7s Ari Schwartz, Using Open Internet Standards to Provide Greater Access in a Post-9/1J
World, 2 ISJLP 125 (2006).
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unalloyed good.76  But the fact remains that information and
communications technologies are enabling and sustaining an
unprecedented degree of active participation in the creation of culture
and of social meaning, and thus fostering conditions under which
secrecy regimes are likely to seem yet more alien and unnatural in the
information society. For better or worse, the idea that a few people are
entitled to know things essential to our individual and collective well-
being, about which the rest of us must remain ignorant, is likely being
undermined by the values of our culture, with the prospect that this
same idea is likely to face more ardent challenges in the world of
politics as well.
76 Although this subject goes beyond the scope of this essay, there is certainly reason to
wonder whether it is helpful to democracy, a process for collective self-governance, if the
ideal of the "untrammeled self' is imported too uncritically into the realm of the policy.
When the military recruits volunteers with the slogan, "An Army of One," or e-government
initiatives tout the promise of "Your Government, Your Way," we ought perhaps to worry that
we are losing sight of what collective self-governance is really about. Especially intriguing,
however, is the fact that the technology that facilitates individual pursuit of the "untrammeled
self' so powerfully is, at its essence, networked technology based on sharing. As individuals
become increasingly alert to the prospects for cooperative gain, one wonders what the impact
on older notions of individualism will be. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS:
THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002).
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